Kosovo: A Russian Perspective

As the December 10th deadline bears down on the Troika (US, EU, and Russia) tasked with deciding the fate of Kosovo, I find myself searching for clarity on the issue. The desire for independence is certainly not a new sentiment on the international scene. From the Caucuses to California, there are hundreds of independence movements worldwide. Indeed I would not be here writing today if it were not for our own such movement. The Kosovars present an undeniably strong case for independence—especially following the atrocities of the 1990’s. Travesties such as the killing of almost 2000 civilians at Gornje Obrinje would drive any of us to seek an autonomous path for survival. However, as the midnight hour approaches, it is a reasonable idea to take a step back and survey the situation from all angles.

The dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia is notoriously bereft of any meaningful discussion of an organized transition. Indeed the chief negotiators in the movement are American, European, and Russian. In a flashback to the mid 20th Century we seem to have forgotten the Kosovars and Serbs are even involved. This is not entirely the faults of the key parties, however, as the nations supposed to be taking the lead seem more interested in trading nationalistic punches than negotiating a formula for independence.

Therefore, let’s take a look at the Russian perspective. The regional administration has proven little more than inept at governing, and displays an interest in independence that seems to be more concerned with the “star-power” such movements can produce than with any uniform national ideal. In fact, recently there have been reports of bands of armed men in black hoods patrolling the Kosovo-Serbian border, proclaiming their duty to defend Kosovo against the Serbian imperialism that the government cannot. If this is any indication of the situation on the ground and the dialogue between both parties is to remain so confrontational, then any nation-building campaign that grants Kosovo immediate independence stands only to destabilize the region more.

Furthermore, the concern over the setting of a dangerous precedent is real and hazardous. Naturally, Russia is worried about the separatist movements in Chechnya and Abkhazia gaining legitimacy, but they are not the only ones with cause for fear. South Ossetia is becoming an increasingly poignant threat to the democratic transition in Georgia, and Transdniester is an ever-present thorn in the sides of both Ukraine and Moldova. How would the US and Europe feel if Russia and China suddenly began vigorously supporting the separatist movements in those regions? Support for an independent Kosovo would very likely elicit such a response, in order to counter the decisions of the West. NATO expansion, the Orange and Rose Revolutions, as well as the advent of an enormously important and unnerving election to determine Russia’s future have set the paranoid minds of the former intelligence officers running that country on a reactionary course. Groaning under increased pressure from easterly expansion, Russian policy-makers see the Kosovo and missile defense issues as “must wins” for a Russian foreign policy bent on stemming the tide of Western expansion.

Despite how we feel about their current slide from democracy, both the US and EU need Russian support on several issues—namely for dealing with Iran and in counterterrorism efforts. Russians will view any decisions contrary to their interests as yet another encroachment by western powers out to get them. Additionally, the situation in Kosovo is not exactly ideal for independence. Currently it bears more resemblance to two Cold War nemeses grappling over a contemporary battleground than leaders uniting to found a modern state. In light of these facts, the Russian course may hold some merit.
Whatever the decision, the goal here is to realize the advantage in pausing a moment to assess our situation. Neither relations with Russia, nor the US position on the world stage are becoming more manageable. However, if we begin to review tough decisions through broader contexts and opposing viewpoints, rather than sticking to the newly developed, singularly exclusive, American foreign policy of late then we give ourselves a much better opportunity to improve our international standing and to avoid making poor decisions in the future.