An article recently ran in my school newspaper, The Miami Student. It discussed the success of last weekends elections in Russia and Venezuela, calling both the first steps in the right direction. While I did not disagree with the analysis of the situation to our south, the rhetoric towards Russia was dangerously acquiescent and the analysis--in my opinion--wrong. Therefore I typed up a response, that hopefully will be run on monday, delineating my views. I am going to post both below, and hopefully it will foment some discussion.
Recent elections leave more to be hoped for, desired
By: Jonathan Gair
Miami Student Op-ed Column 12/7/07
http://media.www.miamistudent.net/media/storage/paper776/news/2007/12/07/OpedPage/Recent.Elections.Leave.More.To.Be.Hoped.For.Desired-3138341.shtml
Last weekend taught us something very important about the presence and execution of democracy in developing authoritarian states, and that's the importance that the leaders of these various states place on establishing a mandate of control from their population. Regardless of how you feel about the progress of democracy in Iraq or Afghanistan, democracy here in the United States, or even wide spread electoral abuses in developing states, the fact is that those voters in Russia and Venezuela this past weekend were able to voice their opinions, for better or for worse.While these elections leave much, much, much more to be desired, they can at least be seen as a step in the right direction of empowering various populations and making their voices and opinions matter. Despite the authoritarian rule in these two countries, the lack of electoral supervision by international agencies, the manipulation of media and the domination of politics by the current parties in power, in Russia concern over how many voters would actually turn out spurred intsense action by the Kremlin. Except for a few months in the middle of 1917, for the decades leading up to the very last years of the Soviet Union, the Russian people had not even known the power of their electoral ability. Even with the overwhelming victory of the President Vladimir Putin-backed United Russia Party, and the lockout of more liberal parties from parliamentary seats, all hope should not be lost. These are the first steps in a system of more voter power-a process that will take generations upon generations to mold. Putin, who used the election as a mandate of support, realized the importance of his citizens and spent the last weeks urging Russians to go to the polls. Yes, a large voter turn out and victory for United Russia (both numbers were more than 60 percent) will be used by Putin to support his claim that his leadership is popularly accepted, but the fact that he had to spend so much time and focus engaging his population shows recognition of their importance.While we can breathe a small, quick sigh of relief that Putin did not try anything this week that threatened the delicate Constitutional legitimacy in Russia, a much more encouraging weekend result came from our south.
RESPONSE:
Goodbye Glasnost
By: Ryan Whelan
Mr. Gair, though you expressed your views on Russia with eloquent justification and your analysis of the Venezuelan situation was spot on, the assertion that Sunday’s election in Russia taught us “the importance [of the fact] that the leaders of these states place on establishing a mandate of control from their population,” is simply wrong. The reality of the situation is that Russia has seen five Duma elections and four Presidential elections since the Soviet Union’s implosion in 1991. All of those elections, even the dubious 1995/96-election season, were freer than the elections held in Russia last Sunday.
You are correct that it would be a significant step for the people of Russia to be provided some means of having their voices heard. However, when students are told by their teachers to vote for United Russia or else face failure in or expulsion from school, the argument that their true opinions are being voiced sounds humorous. This was the case on December second. Factory workers were told to take pictures of their ballots to prove to their foremen that they had voted for the party in power. Teachers were told to check number ten or find a new job. People who did not vote and responded truthfully to security officers, when asked, were escorted to the voting booths and told who to vote for. The extent to which former intelligence officers and current intelligence agencies run the country is unparalleled in any modern democratic society, affording possible retribution to anyone who voted “incorrectly”.
I agree with you, however, that these elections did teach us—or at least remind us—of one very important lesson. It is the same lesson we first became aware of following the October 1917 revolution; the same lesson that Hitler so brilliantly utilized in attaining power. The lesson December second taught us, and that we must strive to remain aware of, was not that government emphasis on public opinion is good. Instead, what we should learn from this year’s election is that when co-opted by an able, intelligent, and charismatic leader, democratic processes provide a justifiable means of subverting democracy itself by opening the gate for a legitimate transition back to authoritarianism. What we should learn is that when manipulated correctly, a democratic government transitions from a free and open society to the most oppressive and destructive one, because it does so with a mandate from its people. Both the Bolsheviks and Nazis rose to power via this avenue, what makes today even more terrifying is that Mr. Putin has learned from his predecessors and become one of the most skilled political tacticians of our time.
Furthermore, the emphasis President Putin and United Russia are placing on public opinion is far from a contemporary realization. The Russians have long understood the power of the masses, and never better than today, having experienced three major revolutions in the past century. Additionally, both the Bolshevik and Nazi Parties invested stifling sums of money into absurdly thorough propaganda machines designed to rally the support of the populace. The recent campaign simply demonstrates Mr. Putin’s deep understanding of the function the masses play in his plan to retain power.
There still remains hope for Russia, but that hope is fading fast. You are correct that a truly democratic transition will take generations to build in a state with such an extensive totalitarian history. However, this election does not represent the first steps of an infant democracy, but the rejuvenation of a latent authoritarianism. To allow such processes to proceed unchallenged is a betrayal of the democratic ideals we claim to represent.
Saturday, December 8, 2007
Tuesday, December 4, 2007
Kosovo: A Russian Perspective
As the December 10th deadline bears down on the Troika (US, EU, and Russia) tasked with deciding the fate of Kosovo, I find myself searching for clarity on the issue. The desire for independence is certainly not a new sentiment on the international scene. From the Caucuses to California, there are hundreds of independence movements worldwide. Indeed I would not be here writing today if it were not for our own such movement. The Kosovars present an undeniably strong case for independence—especially following the atrocities of the 1990’s. Travesties such as the killing of almost 2000 civilians at Gornje Obrinje would drive any of us to seek an autonomous path for survival. However, as the midnight hour approaches, it is a reasonable idea to take a step back and survey the situation from all angles.
The dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia is notoriously bereft of any meaningful discussion of an organized transition. Indeed the chief negotiators in the movement are American, European, and Russian. In a flashback to the mid 20th Century we seem to have forgotten the Kosovars and Serbs are even involved. This is not entirely the faults of the key parties, however, as the nations supposed to be taking the lead seem more interested in trading nationalistic punches than negotiating a formula for independence.
Therefore, let’s take a look at the Russian perspective. The regional administration has proven little more than inept at governing, and displays an interest in independence that seems to be more concerned with the “star-power” such movements can produce than with any uniform national ideal. In fact, recently there have been reports of bands of armed men in black hoods patrolling the Kosovo-Serbian border, proclaiming their duty to defend Kosovo against the Serbian imperialism that the government cannot. If this is any indication of the situation on the ground and the dialogue between both parties is to remain so confrontational, then any nation-building campaign that grants Kosovo immediate independence stands only to destabilize the region more.
Furthermore, the concern over the setting of a dangerous precedent is real and hazardous. Naturally, Russia is worried about the separatist movements in Chechnya and Abkhazia gaining legitimacy, but they are not the only ones with cause for fear. South Ossetia is becoming an increasingly poignant threat to the democratic transition in Georgia, and Transdniester is an ever-present thorn in the sides of both Ukraine and Moldova. How would the US and Europe feel if Russia and China suddenly began vigorously supporting the separatist movements in those regions? Support for an independent Kosovo would very likely elicit such a response, in order to counter the decisions of the West. NATO expansion, the Orange and Rose Revolutions, as well as the advent of an enormously important and unnerving election to determine Russia’s future have set the paranoid minds of the former intelligence officers running that country on a reactionary course. Groaning under increased pressure from easterly expansion, Russian policy-makers see the Kosovo and missile defense issues as “must wins” for a Russian foreign policy bent on stemming the tide of Western expansion.
Despite how we feel about their current slide from democracy, both the US and EU need Russian support on several issues—namely for dealing with Iran and in counterterrorism efforts. Russians will view any decisions contrary to their interests as yet another encroachment by western powers out to get them. Additionally, the situation in Kosovo is not exactly ideal for independence. Currently it bears more resemblance to two Cold War nemeses grappling over a contemporary battleground than leaders uniting to found a modern state. In light of these facts, the Russian course may hold some merit.
Whatever the decision, the goal here is to realize the advantage in pausing a moment to assess our situation. Neither relations with Russia, nor the US position on the world stage are becoming more manageable. However, if we begin to review tough decisions through broader contexts and opposing viewpoints, rather than sticking to the newly developed, singularly exclusive, American foreign policy of late then we give ourselves a much better opportunity to improve our international standing and to avoid making poor decisions in the future.
The dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia is notoriously bereft of any meaningful discussion of an organized transition. Indeed the chief negotiators in the movement are American, European, and Russian. In a flashback to the mid 20th Century we seem to have forgotten the Kosovars and Serbs are even involved. This is not entirely the faults of the key parties, however, as the nations supposed to be taking the lead seem more interested in trading nationalistic punches than negotiating a formula for independence.
Therefore, let’s take a look at the Russian perspective. The regional administration has proven little more than inept at governing, and displays an interest in independence that seems to be more concerned with the “star-power” such movements can produce than with any uniform national ideal. In fact, recently there have been reports of bands of armed men in black hoods patrolling the Kosovo-Serbian border, proclaiming their duty to defend Kosovo against the Serbian imperialism that the government cannot. If this is any indication of the situation on the ground and the dialogue between both parties is to remain so confrontational, then any nation-building campaign that grants Kosovo immediate independence stands only to destabilize the region more.
Furthermore, the concern over the setting of a dangerous precedent is real and hazardous. Naturally, Russia is worried about the separatist movements in Chechnya and Abkhazia gaining legitimacy, but they are not the only ones with cause for fear. South Ossetia is becoming an increasingly poignant threat to the democratic transition in Georgia, and Transdniester is an ever-present thorn in the sides of both Ukraine and Moldova. How would the US and Europe feel if Russia and China suddenly began vigorously supporting the separatist movements in those regions? Support for an independent Kosovo would very likely elicit such a response, in order to counter the decisions of the West. NATO expansion, the Orange and Rose Revolutions, as well as the advent of an enormously important and unnerving election to determine Russia’s future have set the paranoid minds of the former intelligence officers running that country on a reactionary course. Groaning under increased pressure from easterly expansion, Russian policy-makers see the Kosovo and missile defense issues as “must wins” for a Russian foreign policy bent on stemming the tide of Western expansion.
Despite how we feel about their current slide from democracy, both the US and EU need Russian support on several issues—namely for dealing with Iran and in counterterrorism efforts. Russians will view any decisions contrary to their interests as yet another encroachment by western powers out to get them. Additionally, the situation in Kosovo is not exactly ideal for independence. Currently it bears more resemblance to two Cold War nemeses grappling over a contemporary battleground than leaders uniting to found a modern state. In light of these facts, the Russian course may hold some merit.
Whatever the decision, the goal here is to realize the advantage in pausing a moment to assess our situation. Neither relations with Russia, nor the US position on the world stage are becoming more manageable. However, if we begin to review tough decisions through broader contexts and opposing viewpoints, rather than sticking to the newly developed, singularly exclusive, American foreign policy of late then we give ourselves a much better opportunity to improve our international standing and to avoid making poor decisions in the future.
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