Reflections on NATO expansion

As the only super power remaining after the Cold War the United States took upon itself the mission of fostering democratic development and market liberalization across the globe. It seemed the collapse of the Berlin Wall signified a carte blanche to this nation that democracy was surely the way of the future. However, our democratic overtures in the post-soviet world have been met largely with skepticism and occasionally violence. Though our international neighbors are not adverse to the ideals of democratic governance, they are stringently opposed to what they perceive to be the imposition of the American way of life on their traditional value structure. It is within this context that the current debates over NATO expansion and missile defense are evolving.
In 1999 and 2004 NATO embarked upon its greatest enlargements since the inception of the organization in 1949 with complete disregard for the objections of several international actors, including Russia. Only twelve years after the official collapse of the Soviet Union, the Atlantic alliance, the embodiment of Western ideals that the Russians had grown so distrustful of, now included a large chunk of that country’s former territory. The expansion of NATO was coupled with a massive enlargement of the European Union and “pro-Western” revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan. Indeed, from the Russian perspective it seemed they were being systematically isolated from the world they had been striving to be a part of for the last decade.
This past year has seen zero effort on the part of the Western alliance to alleviate these well-founded fears. In 2007 the United States reached an agreement with Poland and Czech Republic to place missiles in Russia’s back yard without so much as a phone call to Moscow. The US did not react to favorably when the Soviet Union proposed to place missiles in Cuba during that infamous showdown in 1962, now it seemed the tables were being turned. As the debate over missile defense heated up the rhetoric on both sides grew increasingly provocative and Russia saw their suggestion of an alternative sight rejected outright—yet another signal to the Kremlin that the West had no interest in cooperation. The next blow came on February 18, 2008 when Kosovo declared itself independent from Serbia. Serbia, a long time ally of Russia, had its traditional homeland torn from its grasp. While this outcome was largely predictable the means by which it took place, without the consent of the Serbian government and over the objections of many members of the international community (including Ukraine and Georgia), infuriated the Kremlin and served as further affirmation that the West has no interest in a mutually beneficial relationship.
Now the United States proposes to admit Ukraine and Georgia to the alliance that Russia sees as a major threat to its internal sovereignty and to regional stability. In light of the information discussed above it should be easily understandable why Russia so ardently opposes both missile defense and NATO expansion. While both events are likely to occur in the future, it is time we take a step back and evaluate the means by which we are pursuing these objectives. There is absolutely no need for the climate to be as cold as it has been over the passed year and it should be the United States that takes the lead in promoting a cooperative and trustworthy dialogue. Russia feels that it has been backed into a corner; when you back a bear into a corner there remain only two possible outcomes: either you can give it a little bit more room to operate or you can expect it to violently lash out with a powerful paw.
With this in mind it is commendable that the Bush administration backed down from their vocal support of Ukrainian and Georgian membership at last week’s summit. If the administration remains more hands-off, it might see some very favorable scenarios begin to develop following the accession of Dimitry Medvedev to the Presidency of Russia on May 7. By pushing too vigorously for Ukrainian and Georgian membership the administration will force Medvedev to kowtow to the wishes of the Siloviki, but if they back off he may just be able to work his way out of the powerful Siloviki grasp, only time will tell.
This is not a statement of support for Russia; indeed their reactionary responses—such as the renewal of strategic bomber over-flights and their withdrawal from the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty—to this western encroachment have not been very productive in encouraging a symbiotic relationship. However, as the self-proclaimed leader of the free world we should be at the forefront of encouraging restraint and rationality in the pursuit of gradual progress rather than persistently indulging in rash action, as has been the case so many times of late. In giving up his fight to initiate the process of Ukrainian and Georgian accession to NATO, President Bush could be sacrificing part of his legacy, but as George Washington demonstrated sometimes when you relinquish the sword you create your greatest legacy of all. Furthermore in waiting to pursue these important objectives the President would be sending a vital message to his successor that while taking into account the strategic interests of the United States it is no longer enough just to be a global actor, we must also be a global thinker.