A discussion on Mccain's Russia policy

Stemming from the RussiaToday headline "Kick Russia out of G8 says McCain," a rather interesting talk has developed amongst some friends and I. Figured I would throw it on here and see if we can get a bit more conversation flowing. Naturally, the conversation just simmered a bit and then I blew the discussion way out of proportion, but hopefully I was provocative enough to elicit some type of response....

The discussion began on facebook, in regards to the above article, as follows:

Chris Fulford: There are a lot of things I disagree on with McCain, but his distinctive stance on Russia just earned him bonus points in my book.

Ryan Whelan: Bonus points for a disagreement or for agreement?

Demic Tipitino: One, McCain does not have the power to do that. It is the Host nations responsibility. But I do think that by taking a more hard lined stance and putting pressure on Russia we might get a better response.

With respect to Obama. He is such a fan of diplomacy, and honestly I agree with him on this, but I would really appreciate it if he knew how to be a diplomat. Obviously Russia is not moving from the G8, but ya know I want my president not to lay down when Russia does the crap they have been doing.

Chris Fulford: Bonus points for agreeing with his opinion of Russia. Since 2001, Putin has taken advantage of Bush's "friendship," and the latter's acknowledgment of his friend's "good soul" is a load of crap to me. The US has needed to take a hard stance on Russia from the beginning. 

Oh, I agree with you, Demic, that the US has no leverage to get Russia out of the G8, but by singling Russia out, McCain is performing a first for US leaders, and I admire him for that.

Demic Tipitino: Ya that is honestly why I like him so much. It is not that he is always right, but that he is always him. You remember in 2000? in the South Carolina debate Putin had won already, and they asked Bush and McCain what they thought about him. Bush described his typical I looked into his eyes and he is a good honest man stuff.

McCain said "I look into his eyes and I see three things... K...G....B lol how right he was.

Ryan Whelan: I must say, that while I admire Mccain's impassioned stance and do not disagree with the spirit of the argument or the tough stance, I do think calling for Russia to be ousted from the G8 is the wrong way of going about achieving democratic progress within Russia. I agree with both of you that we do not have leverage to force the Russians our of the G8, but even if we did it would be a step that is completely counterproductive to our national interest. While Russia has introduced a few too many authoritarian measures and drastically re-centralized control, we cannot underestimate the propensity of the Russian mind to overreact. 

I do not know how much I would say that Putin has taken advantage of President Bush's "friendship," because I think most of what has been done would have happened anyway, because it needed to happen, at least from the Russian perspective it did. The reigning in of the oligarchs was a major accomplishment, and though the subsequent passage of a law making all regional heads subject to Kremlin appointment did squelch regional opposition at least in the short run, it also leaves the door open for democratic reforms that could foster democratic opposition in the future.

There is a new President in the hot seat, and while he probably does not have the complete mandate that Putin did (because he does still have to answer to the silverback), he does have the potential to have considerable influence on foreign policy. We all understand that the Russians feel as though the are being suffocated by Western influence.

Bases in Kyrgyzstan and only recently removed form Uzbekistan. Bases in Turkey, rapidly warming relations and the possibility of NATO for Georgia and Ukraine (Ukraine of course still housing a significant portion of Russia's Black Sea fleet and Georgia in the current row of Abkhazia), the loss of Kosovo and a pro EU government in Serbia, Missile defense systems being placed in Czech Republic and Poland. Indeed, simply geographically speaking it is certainly understandable that russia feels there is a noose slowly tightening around its neck. Furthermore, the renegotiation of energy contracts with western companies is not an anomaly, and has been the norm throughout Central Asia and other resource rich countries that did not have the capacity to research possible deposits on their own.

There is no doubt that the Russian way implements some more authoritarian principles than we would like. However, our immediate policy should be one of patience and gentle pressure. They are in the G8, we should push them from within the G8, and we have a little bit more of an advantage to pressure them to reform before entering into the WTO. But, we have yet to see the full extent of the action that President Medvedev will be able to take, and probably will not until after our own elections.

I do think Mccain's tough stance on Russia is a good one, especially for the election. However, I think he should propose reasonable means for pressuring them, or else he looks like he is either an idiot or a politician simply maneuvering for a vote. Furthermore he should demonstrate a bit more of an understanding of Russian history and a bit more sympathy for their situation when Putin came to power when implying his constructive supposed to take the lead in everything. We need to put a little bit of faith in our Russian brothers, while keeping up a steady, but not-to-harsh stream of advice, and give the Russians a chance to come around under their new president. If there has been no progress within a year to 18 months, then it will be time for more drastic action.

Please, get involved and share your thoughts...

Reflections on a Future Foreign Policy

On a crisp November day in 1989, one of the most poignant scenes of recent memory dominated news around the globe. The Berlin wall had fallen; East and West Berliners—in a symbolic demonstration of the greater action that was soon to come—scattered tears of joy over the bloodstained soil that had divided them for almost thirty years. The Cold War was over. Yet twenty years after the climactic conclusion to one of the tensest periods in global history, we remain woefully ignorant of the lessons that the Cold War era had to teach us.
For decades, the globe was defined by a titanic rivalry, propagated by fear and driven by misunderstanding. The Wall became a permanent symbol of the chasm that separated the world’s superpowers and, at times, a grotesque reminder of the consequences that this partition wrought. The Fall elicited a new hope, from all sides, that finally we were entering an era of understanding, an era of cooperation, and an era of peace. Democracy became the proven government of the world, and now all peoples could willfully submit to its rule without hesitation or fear that it would bring violent retribution from a gleaming sickle or a stained hammer. The new democracies of Eastern Europe and Central Asia were praised as the embodiment of this success, and beacons to the world of the benefits that free markets and free peoples can bring to all.
Few stopped to observe humanity in its true light. Few recognized that the bipolar world of the past had unwittingly provided a black and white backdrop, upon which the political drama could easily play out. With the fall of communism, the black yielded, leaving a blank canvas ready to be splattered with a kaleidoscope of global dilemmas that had previously been overshadowed by the caustic bickering of Cold War politics. In the words of former CIA director James Woolsey, “it’s as if we were fighting with dragon for some 45 years and slew the dragon and then found ourselves in a jungle full of a number of poisonous snakes.”
This is no reason to lose hope, however, as our experiences during the Cold War, indeed the very measures that sustained it, hold the key to solving the problems that we presently face. Today’s obstacles will never be overcome through unilateral dictation, and though at times a policy of tough love has its merits, leadership demands that we approach each situation with an attitude of cautious compassion and open ourselves to the liberating possibilities of global thought. In this era of globalization and multinational exchange, the singular vision of the Cold War will incapacitate this country in its efforts to foster democratic development, and instead align it with the very forms of tyranny that it seeks to defeat. Understanding this fact, however, is impossible as long as we anchor ourselves to the narrow belief that because of our success we know best. It takes courage, it takes risk, it will take suffering, but we must, we must no longer address situations from our own privileged perspective, but endeavor to understand the perspectives of those we seek to aid. In constructing a new National Security Strategy and organizing a new foreign policy, it is of vital urgency that this transformation be a primary task of the next President of the United States.
When, in the first great foreign policy act of this nation, the founding fathers gathered in Philadelphia to declare our independence to the world it was a message of hope, of possibility, and of new beginning. We were at the forefront of global political development. We dared to be great; we took the dive and plunged into the depths of uncertainty, and we emerged as one of the greatest achievements in world history. We must find that path once more. What will be the next great step? Who will again thrust this nation to the margins of global development? The wall fell almost twenty years ago, it’s time we take down the walls that remain in our own minds. It’s time to dare greatness once again and take the next step towards a better world.

A new hope in Medvedev's Russia?

I wrote this article a little over a month ago for the Miami Student here at Miami University, but the principles remain true and hopefully will give some perspective on what we can hope for coming up following the turn over next week (May 7) in Moscow. Enjoy, and as usual I would appreciate any feedback.

A recent meeting between German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Russian President-elect Dmitry Medvedev of Russia spawned little hope in the mind of the German leader. Following the meeting in Moscow, Merkel told reporters, "I think there will be continuity. I do not think that the controversies will just disappear." Indeed, vocal statements by both President Vladimir Putin and Medvedev that the former will remain a strong influence-at least for a time-in Russian policy makes it difficult to be hopeful for any drastic policy change. Still, given this monarchic transition, it is prudent to look at the signs for what may happen in the future.

There is no doubt that the infamous Putin will remain a driving force behind Kremlin policy, probably from the post of prime minister. However, there are some signs to indicate Medvedev may be less of a puppet than many expect. For example, Putin has hinted several times that he would maintain control of Russia's foreign policy and given his obvious skill in this area-coupled with Medvedev's strong economic background-such a construct is not an absurd idea. Yet, recently Medvedev stated that he would maintain control over Russian foreign policy, as has been the prerogative of the post of president since 1993. Whether the presidency retains this competency or whether its policy-making powers are transferred to the prime minister-ship, Putin will maintain a strong amount of influence over Russian strategy. If Medvedev retains these constitutional powers, then it will be a major statement by the new president that he does not expect Putin's influence to remain eternally involved.

Furthermore, Putin himself has actually left the door open for Medvedev to alter Kremlin policy once he is officially sworn in as president May 7. Interestingly, in the area of granting presidential pardons, Putin has stated that such acts will remain a competency of the head of state. This means that should he so choose, Medvedev could actually pardon oil magnate Mikhail Khodorkovsky-a Russian oligarch that has been imprisoned on tax fraud and evasion charges since 2003. Khodorkovsky was largely viewed as a last major threat to Kremlin primacy and his imprisonment ended the oligarch's ability to provide regional opposition to the Kremlin administration. If Medvedev were to pardon Khodorkovsky, it would signal an interesting departure from the paranoid, power-thirsty years of the Putin administration and would be a significant step in the right direction for Russian democratic development.

Finally, in picking Medvedev, Putin has brought to the fore a young man whose soft-spoken manner is a drastic shift from the tradition of KGB "manly-men" who have long been perceived as necessary to lead the great Russian nation. Medvedev was certainly a Kremlin compromise between the highly powerful siloviki (former KGB and military men) and the more liberal economic wing. If Medvedev is able to demonstrate to this cohort that an outsider can competently lead the nation without weakening its international standing, he would be in prime position to gently begin liberalizing the Russian government.

In the short run, any major change in the status quo is highly unlikely. The Kremlin's influential security and defense arm will be skeptical of Medvedev for a while. If the new president is able to maintain control of the competencies of the president and to successfully work with the former president to allay the fears of the siloviki, he will be in a strong position for liberal action (beginning in the economic sector). Medvedev's soft-spoken style may actually aid him in accomplishing these tasks. Just as Putin surged forward to consolidate power at a critical time, perhaps Medvedev will do the same for Russian democracy.

Reflections on NATO expansion

As the only super power remaining after the Cold War the United States took upon itself the mission of fostering democratic development and market liberalization across the globe. It seemed the collapse of the Berlin Wall signified a carte blanche to this nation that democracy was surely the way of the future. However, our democratic overtures in the post-soviet world have been met largely with skepticism and occasionally violence. Though our international neighbors are not adverse to the ideals of democratic governance, they are stringently opposed to what they perceive to be the imposition of the American way of life on their traditional value structure. It is within this context that the current debates over NATO expansion and missile defense are evolving.
In 1999 and 2004 NATO embarked upon its greatest enlargements since the inception of the organization in 1949 with complete disregard for the objections of several international actors, including Russia. Only twelve years after the official collapse of the Soviet Union, the Atlantic alliance, the embodiment of Western ideals that the Russians had grown so distrustful of, now included a large chunk of that country’s former territory. The expansion of NATO was coupled with a massive enlargement of the European Union and “pro-Western” revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan. Indeed, from the Russian perspective it seemed they were being systematically isolated from the world they had been striving to be a part of for the last decade.
This past year has seen zero effort on the part of the Western alliance to alleviate these well-founded fears. In 2007 the United States reached an agreement with Poland and Czech Republic to place missiles in Russia’s back yard without so much as a phone call to Moscow. The US did not react to favorably when the Soviet Union proposed to place missiles in Cuba during that infamous showdown in 1962, now it seemed the tables were being turned. As the debate over missile defense heated up the rhetoric on both sides grew increasingly provocative and Russia saw their suggestion of an alternative sight rejected outright—yet another signal to the Kremlin that the West had no interest in cooperation. The next blow came on February 18, 2008 when Kosovo declared itself independent from Serbia. Serbia, a long time ally of Russia, had its traditional homeland torn from its grasp. While this outcome was largely predictable the means by which it took place, without the consent of the Serbian government and over the objections of many members of the international community (including Ukraine and Georgia), infuriated the Kremlin and served as further affirmation that the West has no interest in a mutually beneficial relationship.
Now the United States proposes to admit Ukraine and Georgia to the alliance that Russia sees as a major threat to its internal sovereignty and to regional stability. In light of the information discussed above it should be easily understandable why Russia so ardently opposes both missile defense and NATO expansion. While both events are likely to occur in the future, it is time we take a step back and evaluate the means by which we are pursuing these objectives. There is absolutely no need for the climate to be as cold as it has been over the passed year and it should be the United States that takes the lead in promoting a cooperative and trustworthy dialogue. Russia feels that it has been backed into a corner; when you back a bear into a corner there remain only two possible outcomes: either you can give it a little bit more room to operate or you can expect it to violently lash out with a powerful paw.
With this in mind it is commendable that the Bush administration backed down from their vocal support of Ukrainian and Georgian membership at last week’s summit. If the administration remains more hands-off, it might see some very favorable scenarios begin to develop following the accession of Dimitry Medvedev to the Presidency of Russia on May 7. By pushing too vigorously for Ukrainian and Georgian membership the administration will force Medvedev to kowtow to the wishes of the Siloviki, but if they back off he may just be able to work his way out of the powerful Siloviki grasp, only time will tell.
This is not a statement of support for Russia; indeed their reactionary responses—such as the renewal of strategic bomber over-flights and their withdrawal from the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty—to this western encroachment have not been very productive in encouraging a symbiotic relationship. However, as the self-proclaimed leader of the free world we should be at the forefront of encouraging restraint and rationality in the pursuit of gradual progress rather than persistently indulging in rash action, as has been the case so many times of late. In giving up his fight to initiate the process of Ukrainian and Georgian accession to NATO, President Bush could be sacrificing part of his legacy, but as George Washington demonstrated sometimes when you relinquish the sword you create your greatest legacy of all. Furthermore in waiting to pursue these important objectives the President would be sending a vital message to his successor that while taking into account the strategic interests of the United States it is no longer enough just to be a global actor, we must also be a global thinker.