On a crisp November day in 1989, one of the most poignant scenes of recent memory dominated news around the globe. The Berlin wall had fallen; East and West Berliners—in a symbolic demonstration of the greater action that was soon to come—scattered tears of joy over the bloodstained soil that had divided them for almost thirty years. The Cold War was over. Yet twenty years after the climactic conclusion to one of the tensest periods in global history, we remain woefully ignorant of the lessons that the Cold War era had to teach us.
For decades, the globe was defined by a titanic rivalry, propagated by fear and driven by misunderstanding. The Wall became a permanent symbol of the chasm that separated the world’s superpowers and, at times, a grotesque reminder of the consequences that this partition wrought. The Fall elicited a new hope, from all sides, that finally we were entering an era of understanding, an era of cooperation, and an era of peace. Democracy became the proven government of the world, and now all peoples could willfully submit to its rule without hesitation or fear that it would bring violent retribution from a gleaming sickle or a stained hammer. The new democracies of Eastern Europe and Central Asia were praised as the embodiment of this success, and beacons to the world of the benefits that free markets and free peoples can bring to all.
Few stopped to observe humanity in its true light. Few recognized that the bipolar world of the past had unwittingly provided a black and white backdrop, upon which the political drama could easily play out. With the fall of communism, the black yielded, leaving a blank canvas ready to be splattered with a kaleidoscope of global dilemmas that had previously been overshadowed by the caustic bickering of Cold War politics. In the words of former CIA director James Woolsey, “it’s as if we were fighting with dragon for some 45 years and slew the dragon and then found ourselves in a jungle full of a number of poisonous snakes.”
This is no reason to lose hope, however, as our experiences during the Cold War, indeed the very measures that sustained it, hold the key to solving the problems that we presently face. Today’s obstacles will never be overcome through unilateral dictation, and though at times a policy of tough love has its merits, leadership demands that we approach each situation with an attitude of cautious compassion and open ourselves to the liberating possibilities of global thought. In this era of globalization and multinational exchange, the singular vision of the Cold War will incapacitate this country in its efforts to foster democratic development, and instead align it with the very forms of tyranny that it seeks to defeat. Understanding this fact, however, is impossible as long as we anchor ourselves to the narrow belief that because of our success we know best. It takes courage, it takes risk, it will take suffering, but we must, we must no longer address situations from our own privileged perspective, but endeavor to understand the perspectives of those we seek to aid. In constructing a new National Security Strategy and organizing a new foreign policy, it is of vital urgency that this transformation be a primary task of the next President of the United States.
When, in the first great foreign policy act of this nation, the founding fathers gathered in Philadelphia to declare our independence to the world it was a message of hope, of possibility, and of new beginning. We were at the forefront of global political development. We dared to be great; we took the dive and plunged into the depths of uncertainty, and we emerged as one of the greatest achievements in world history. We must find that path once more. What will be the next great step? Who will again thrust this nation to the margins of global development? The wall fell almost twenty years ago, it’s time we take down the walls that remain in our own minds. It’s time to dare greatness once again and take the next step towards a better world.
Friday, May 2, 2008
A new hope in Medvedev's Russia?
I wrote this article a little over a month ago for the Miami Student here at Miami University, but the principles remain true and hopefully will give some perspective on what we can hope for coming up following the turn over next week (May 7) in Moscow. Enjoy, and as usual I would appreciate any feedback.
A recent meeting between German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Russian President-elect Dmitry Medvedev of Russia spawned little hope in the mind of the German leader. Following the meeting in Moscow, Merkel told reporters, "I think there will be continuity. I do not think that the controversies will just disappear." Indeed, vocal statements by both President Vladimir Putin and Medvedev that the former will remain a strong influence-at least for a time-in Russian policy makes it difficult to be hopeful for any drastic policy change. Still, given this monarchic transition, it is prudent to look at the signs for what may happen in the future.
There is no doubt that the infamous Putin will remain a driving force behind Kremlin policy, probably from the post of prime minister. However, there are some signs to indicate Medvedev may be less of a puppet than many expect. For example, Putin has hinted several times that he would maintain control of Russia's foreign policy and given his obvious skill in this area-coupled with Medvedev's strong economic background-such a construct is not an absurd idea. Yet, recently Medvedev stated that he would maintain control over Russian foreign policy, as has been the prerogative of the post of president since 1993. Whether the presidency retains this competency or whether its policy-making powers are transferred to the prime minister-ship, Putin will maintain a strong amount of influence over Russian strategy. If Medvedev retains these constitutional powers, then it will be a major statement by the new president that he does not expect Putin's influence to remain eternally involved.
Furthermore, Putin himself has actually left the door open for Medvedev to alter Kremlin policy once he is officially sworn in as president May 7. Interestingly, in the area of granting presidential pardons, Putin has stated that such acts will remain a competency of the head of state. This means that should he so choose, Medvedev could actually pardon oil magnate Mikhail Khodorkovsky-a Russian oligarch that has been imprisoned on tax fraud and evasion charges since 2003. Khodorkovsky was largely viewed as a last major threat to Kremlin primacy and his imprisonment ended the oligarch's ability to provide regional opposition to the Kremlin administration. If Medvedev were to pardon Khodorkovsky, it would signal an interesting departure from the paranoid, power-thirsty years of the Putin administration and would be a significant step in the right direction for Russian democratic development.
Finally, in picking Medvedev, Putin has brought to the fore a young man whose soft-spoken manner is a drastic shift from the tradition of KGB "manly-men" who have long been perceived as necessary to lead the great Russian nation. Medvedev was certainly a Kremlin compromise between the highly powerful siloviki (former KGB and military men) and the more liberal economic wing. If Medvedev is able to demonstrate to this cohort that an outsider can competently lead the nation without weakening its international standing, he would be in prime position to gently begin liberalizing the Russian government.
In the short run, any major change in the status quo is highly unlikely. The Kremlin's influential security and defense arm will be skeptical of Medvedev for a while. If the new president is able to maintain control of the competencies of the president and to successfully work with the former president to allay the fears of the siloviki, he will be in a strong position for liberal action (beginning in the economic sector). Medvedev's soft-spoken style may actually aid him in accomplishing these tasks. Just as Putin surged forward to consolidate power at a critical time, perhaps Medvedev will do the same for Russian democracy.
A recent meeting between German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Russian President-elect Dmitry Medvedev of Russia spawned little hope in the mind of the German leader. Following the meeting in Moscow, Merkel told reporters, "I think there will be continuity. I do not think that the controversies will just disappear." Indeed, vocal statements by both President Vladimir Putin and Medvedev that the former will remain a strong influence-at least for a time-in Russian policy makes it difficult to be hopeful for any drastic policy change. Still, given this monarchic transition, it is prudent to look at the signs for what may happen in the future.
There is no doubt that the infamous Putin will remain a driving force behind Kremlin policy, probably from the post of prime minister. However, there are some signs to indicate Medvedev may be less of a puppet than many expect. For example, Putin has hinted several times that he would maintain control of Russia's foreign policy and given his obvious skill in this area-coupled with Medvedev's strong economic background-such a construct is not an absurd idea. Yet, recently Medvedev stated that he would maintain control over Russian foreign policy, as has been the prerogative of the post of president since 1993. Whether the presidency retains this competency or whether its policy-making powers are transferred to the prime minister-ship, Putin will maintain a strong amount of influence over Russian strategy. If Medvedev retains these constitutional powers, then it will be a major statement by the new president that he does not expect Putin's influence to remain eternally involved.
Furthermore, Putin himself has actually left the door open for Medvedev to alter Kremlin policy once he is officially sworn in as president May 7. Interestingly, in the area of granting presidential pardons, Putin has stated that such acts will remain a competency of the head of state. This means that should he so choose, Medvedev could actually pardon oil magnate Mikhail Khodorkovsky-a Russian oligarch that has been imprisoned on tax fraud and evasion charges since 2003. Khodorkovsky was largely viewed as a last major threat to Kremlin primacy and his imprisonment ended the oligarch's ability to provide regional opposition to the Kremlin administration. If Medvedev were to pardon Khodorkovsky, it would signal an interesting departure from the paranoid, power-thirsty years of the Putin administration and would be a significant step in the right direction for Russian democratic development.
Finally, in picking Medvedev, Putin has brought to the fore a young man whose soft-spoken manner is a drastic shift from the tradition of KGB "manly-men" who have long been perceived as necessary to lead the great Russian nation. Medvedev was certainly a Kremlin compromise between the highly powerful siloviki (former KGB and military men) and the more liberal economic wing. If Medvedev is able to demonstrate to this cohort that an outsider can competently lead the nation without weakening its international standing, he would be in prime position to gently begin liberalizing the Russian government.
In the short run, any major change in the status quo is highly unlikely. The Kremlin's influential security and defense arm will be skeptical of Medvedev for a while. If the new president is able to maintain control of the competencies of the president and to successfully work with the former president to allay the fears of the siloviki, he will be in a strong position for liberal action (beginning in the economic sector). Medvedev's soft-spoken style may actually aid him in accomplishing these tasks. Just as Putin surged forward to consolidate power at a critical time, perhaps Medvedev will do the same for Russian democracy.
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